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Legal research starts with an idea. Triggering a researcher’s interest, curiosity or 
imagination begins the research process aimed at formulating a clear research 
question, finding a fruitful approach2 and establishing rigorous answers. 
Throughout this process, legal research involves methodological assessments. 
Some concern choosing and delineating the field of inquiry. Awareness of the 
need for methodological assessments when delineating a field of inquiry is called 
for in various research areas such as doctrinal research (Vranken 2011, p. 117 
and p. 119), international law (d’Aspremont 2015, p. 177-198) and legal theory 
(Donnelly 2007, p. 78). A vital component of such a methodological perspective 
is to establish pursuit-worthy lines of inquiry (see generally Šešelja, Kosolosky & 
Straßer 2012; Šešelja & Straßer 2014; Whitt 1990; 1992). Legal researchers estab-
lish pursuit-worthy lines of inquiry by constructing and exploring promising 
lines of inquiry in search of fruitful contributions to improved understanding of 
law. Simultaneously, researchers remain open-minded as to whether such inquiry 
ultimately results in the best approach to answering the research question and to 
contributing to improved understanding of law (see generally Šešelja, Kosolosky 
& Straßer 2012; Šešelja & Straßer 2014; Whitt 1990; 1992).
Two aspects of how researchers establish pursuit-worthy lines of inquiry are 
highlighted. The first aspect is to construct promising lines of inquiry. The sec-
ond aspect is to clarify provisionally the potential of various promising lines of 
inquiry. Discourse with fellow researchers is essential to clarifying and calibrat-
ing such potential. Highlighting such aspects increases awareness of how legal 
researchers assess lines of inquiry and choose pursuit-worthy ones. Awareness 
of these methodological assessments is vital to contemporary discourse about 
legal methodology, where there is considerable debate on what constitutes – for 
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priateness and methodological awareness of both the possibilities and limitations of various 
approaches (see van Gestel, Micklitz & Maduro 2012, p. 2, 5 and 20).
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instance – fruitful, valuable and interesting legal research (see e.g., Dickson 
2017; Enoch 2015). Such awareness is particularly important when developing 
and articulating interest in the fruitful diversity – arguably even the continuity 
(Giudice 2015, p. 213) – of complementary and conflicting approaches to under-
standing law.
To identify and explain why establishing pursuit-worthy lines of inquiry is inte-
gral to legal research, section two briefly sets improved understanding of law as a 
general aim for legal research and adjusts it to suit the perspective of researchers 
interested in exploring the potential for gaining insight into law by pursuing cer-
tain lines of inquiry.3 Section three indicates current debate about pursuit as inte-
gral to legal research. Sections four and five outline the two mentioned aspects 
of how legal researchers assess which lines of inquiry are worth pursuing. Section 
six maps avenues for future research and offers concluding remarks.
2 Aspiring for Improved Understanding of Law
Legal research aspires for improved understanding of law (Giudice 2015, p. 229; 
Halpin 2009, p. 145),4 an understanding that is richer, deeper or more comprehen-
sive. Concerning what represents improved understanding, most legal research-
ers share some overarching research ideals, or ‘generally accepted quality criteria 
for legal research’ (Vranken 2011, p. 120). These ideals simultaneously ‘guide and 
constrain’ (Whitt 1990, p. 472) what constitutes improved understanding. Such 
research ideals include ‘originality (innovation), rigour, significance, thorough-
ness and exploring boundaries’ (p. 120 footnote omitted).5
Most legal researchers generally agree on what these ideals entail. For example, 
even though the issue of originality is controversial (Siems 2008, p. 148), most 
agree that innovative legal researchers ‘make connections that others do not see, 
or shed new light from an unexpected angle on an existing problem’ (Vranken 
2011, p. 112). For instance, inquiring into a ‘principle of humanity’ in interna-
tional humanitarian law is innovative when it produces ‘greater clarity concerning 
the possible emergence, existence, function and significance’ of such a principle 
(Larsen, Cooper & Nystuen 2013, p. 1).
Still, what constitutes improved understanding is debated by legal scholars. 
Several factors cause controversy. One is that ‘improved understanding of law’ 
sets an abstract aim, which can be specified differently. Does clarity imply sim-
plicity, for instance, and if so, which kind of simplicity (Aroney 2013, p. 9-10)? 
Sometimes complex concepts are arguably most clarifying (Alexy 2002, p. 43). 
In addition, diverse ways of achieving better understanding can be prioritized 
differently, depending on the research question (see e.g., Aroney 2013, p. 10). 
Another cause of controversy is the manifold kinds of legal research, such as legal 
3 Such adjustment is inspired by Šešelja and Straßer 2014, see e.g., p. 3117.
4 Other general aims and their interrelations are not scrutinized.
5 Additional criteria may adhere to specific research methods.
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doctrinal research, general jurisprudence and normative jurisprudence, with 
sometimes differing perspectives on what constitutes improved understanding. 
How the use-value of legal research for legal practice correlates with the general 
aim of achieving better understanding is often of central concern.6 Additionally, 
improving understanding is not a binary endeavour, but one of degrees.
In short, certainty in this endeavour is elusive; indeed, there are ‘different nor-
mative points of view on what it means to improve or develop the law’ (de Been, 
Taekema & van Klink 2016, p. 17). What both suggests nascent understanding 
and ultimately constitutes improved understanding probably varies depending 
on the theoretical perspective or framework (Taekema & van der Burg 2014, 
p. 130), or according to the concept(s) of systematicity – as in science generally 
( Hoyningen-Huene 2013, p. 28). One way of achieving systematicity is to inves-
tigate the consistency and coherence of a legal system of rules. Viewed in this 
theoretical perspective, improved understanding can be produced when research-
ers build or enhance systems of rules, such as by clarifying newly formed rules, 
elucidating additions to existing rules and uncovering interconnections between 
rules. However, such ‘systematicity of rules’, as phrased by d’Aspremont (2017, 
p. 367), is not a static, ready-made theoretical perspective. Delineating a system 
of rules involves methodological assessments and choices made by the researcher 
(d’Aspremont 2017, p. 370; Vranken 2011, p. 114-118). Additionally, such system-
aticity of rules is not the only achievable form of systematicity in legal research 
(Vranken 2011, p. 118). Systematicity ‘of legal arguments’ might be another 
( d’Aspremont 2017, p. 367). Differing forms of systematicity also probably overlap 
(d’Aspremont 2017, p. 369) – as they do in science generally ( Hoyningen-Huene 
2013, p. 28). Consequently, deciding what constitutes improved understand-
ing depends on legal researchers’ methodological assessments and subsequent 
choices.
Such methodological assessments and choices are most apparent when discussing 
what constitutes the best approach to researching law. Presently, legal scholars 
extensively debate several methodological questions concerning why particular 
research methods or approaches generally should be considered the preferred 
route to improved understanding. Why employ constructive conceptual explana-
tion, for instance (Giudice 2015)? Why employ an approach to international law 
with empirical components entitled ‘European New Legal Realism’ (Holtermann 
& Madsen 2015)? Some even claim the superiority of a particular approach.7
Equally important is that researchers choose how to pursue legal research in 
light of methodological assessments of what constitutes improved understand-
ing. Such assessments of what is pursuit worthy in legal research differ slightly 
from assessments of what ultimately constitutes the best approach (see generally 
Šešelja, Kosolosky & Straßer 2012; Šešelja & Straßer 2014; Whitt 1990; 1992). 
6 Questions regarding the usefulness of legal research for legal practice or as background for 
lawmaking will not be scrutinized.
7 Claims of one specific method as ‘the correct method which all theories of law must adopt’ 
(Giudice 2015, p. 164) are not scrutinized here.
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Both assessment modalities aspire for improved understanding, but, essentially, 
assessments of what is pursuit worthy are explorative and tentative. They are 
explorative because researchers attempt to develop important8 (see e.g., Donnelly 
2007, p. 82; Šešelja & Straßer 2014 p. 3123-3137) insight using both traversed 
lines of inquiry and newly discovered theoretical landscapes while remaining 
open-minded as to whether such inquiry ultimately results in the best approach 
to answering the research question and to contributing to improved understand-
ing of law (regarding open-mindedness generally, see e.g., Whitt 1990, p. 476). 
In pursuit of improved understanding, researchers will ask: How and why will 
exploring this subject matter by using particular lines of inquiry contribute? 
(Regarding prospectiveness generally, see Šešelja & Straßer 2014, p. 3117; Whitt 
1992, p. 616.) Will the research contribute by developing law at a high level of gen-
erality, for instance? Or does the research target comparatively specific insight 
(Aroney 2013, p. 10 and p. 24; Donnelly 2007, p. 82)? Will the research be har-
monious with neighbouring research, or will it contrast with the present under-
standing of law? In short, assessing how to pursue legal research is to explore the 
potential of promising lines of inquiry (regarding promise generally, see Šešelja & 
Straßer 2014, p. 3115; Whitt 1990, p. 471; 1992, p. 616).9 Assessments of what is 
pursuit worthy in legal research are also tentative because the provisional poten-
tial must be clarified and further scrutinized – above all, in discourse with fellow 
legal researchers. I will return to this aspect of assessing pursuit-worthy lines of 
inquiry in section five. First, a few words on how pursuit as exploring the poten-
tial of diverse approaches is currently debated in legal scholarship.
3 Pursuit Worthy?
The notion of pursuit as integral to legal research is presently surfacing in legal 
scholarship. Several legal researchers in contemporary debate about legal meth-
odology believe that it is important to seek and distinguish the potential in dif-
ferent approaches to understanding law. For example, cooperation is encouraged 
between legal philosophy, legal sociology and doctrinal legal scholarship in order 
to ‘gain a full understanding of law in all its facets’ (Taekema & van der Burg 2014, 
p. 142). Another example is to explore the merits of different senses of explan-
atory priorities and methodological approaches (Dickson 2013, p. 364). A third 
example is to clarify the relative explanatory powers of legal theories in ‘paired 
qualities’ (Aroney 2013, p. 2) to enable a ‘rigorous pursuit of explanatory power’ 
(p. 3 and p. 24). A fourth example is Giudice’s fronting of the constructive con-
ceptual explanation as fruitful in exploring the ‘value of seeking to understand 
8 Whether some aspects must necessarily be included, and if so in what sense, are well-known 
questions in legal philosophy, but this discursive strand will not be scrutinized.
9 Possible differences between evaluating the intrinsic potential of one line of inquiry and com-
paratively evaluating alternatives (see Šešelja, Kosolosky & Straßer 2012, p. 4-5) are not scruti-
nized.
Law_and_Method_Pursuing_Legal_Research.indd   4 6-7-2017   13:26:36
This article from Law and Method is published by Boom juridisch and made available to anonieme bezoeker
Pursuing Legal Research
Law and Method 5
and pursue relations – both complementary and conflicting – between diverse 
approaches to understanding law’ (2015, p. 213). Finally, a fifth example is Hal-
pin’s elaboration of the ‘initial elucidatory expository’, ‘secondary expository’, 
‘exploratory explanatory’ and ‘normatively exploratory’ roles of conceptual anal-
ysis (2009, p. 149-150) and methodology (p. 154).
These examples both highlight and exhibit that researchers often ‘do some-
thing other than accept or reject’ (Whitt 1990, p. 467, see also Šešelja & Straßer 
2014, p. 3121; Whitt 1992, p. 632) possible approaches to law – we pursue dif-
ferent approaches to understanding law in order to explore their potential when 
researching a field of inquiry.
Worth highlighting, to clarify the notion of pursuit as integral to legal research, 
is a development in discourse about research generally. Generally, the ‘notion of 
the context of pursuit resulted from the discussion on the traditional distinc-
tion between the context of discovery and the context of justification’ (Šešelja 
& Straßer 2014, p. 3113, see also p. 3120-3121; Šešelja, Kosolosky & Straßer 
2012, p. 1).10 The term ‘context of pursuit’ is usually attributed to Laudan (1977). 
Recently, Šešelja and Straßer have highlighted that awareness of the context of 
pursuit in research is important:
[W]hat we are concerned with in the context of pursuit is not the question as 
to whether a theory is acceptable, but as to whether there are good epistemic 
reasons for its further pursuit. We will say that a theory is epistemically worthy 
of pursuit to the extent that it can be shown to have a promising potential for 
contributing to those epistemic goals that determine theory acceptance, as 
well as to the value of robustness of scientific knowledge (2014, p. 3114-3115, 
italics in original).
Šešelja and Straßer offer ‘potential coherence’ (p. 3121) as crucial to assess the 
potential of ‘explanatory theoretical frameworks’ (p. 3115). They elaborate four 
‘prospective values’ (p. 3117) for the evaluation of ‘pursuit worthiness’: ‘Potential 
Explanatory Power’, ‘Potential Inferential Density’, ‘Potential Consistency’ and 
‘Programmatic character’ (Šešelja & Straßer 2014, p. 3123).11 These prospective 
values, as I understand Šešelja and Straßer, both guide and constrain (see p. 3133) 
the pursuit of robust12 scientific knowledge. Worth mentioning is that Šešelja 
and Straßer ‘focus … on the assessment of pursuit worthiness of young theories’ 
(p. 3115) and that they elaborate ‘initial’ and ‘successive’ assessments of pursuit 
10 See p. 3114 for their overview of literature where the question ‘whether a given scientific idea 
is worthy of pursuit’ (p. 3113-3114) is found as ‘evaluation under different names’ (p. 3114). 
See also Šešelja, Kosolosky and Straßer (2012, p. 1-2). 
11 ‘Non-epistemic factors’ can impact assessments of pursuit worthiness (Šešelja & Straßer 2014, 
p. 3115 and p. 3135). See also Šešelja, Kosolosky and Straßer (2012, p. 9-12); Whitt (1990, 
p. 470).
12 ‘Robust’ is explained as being ‘able to maintain its key functions of explaining and helping us 
to understand the world, by means of avoiding and, if necessary, by overcoming scientific crisis’ 
(p. 3112).
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worthiness (p. 3123). Further interdisciplinary research is needed to transpose 
these prospective values into discourse about legal research, for instance, because 
coherence in law embodies a well-known complex relation to consistency and pos-
sibly entails a crucial link to legal principles (Amaya 2015, p. 472). Still, mindful 
of this reservation, the term ‘pursuit worthiness’ can be used when discussing 
how legal researchers construct and explore promising lines of inquiry.
Before returning to how legal researchers pursue such potential for insight, it is 
worth mentioning that the term ‘context of pursuit’ is not widespread in legal 
scholarship. An exception is found in Amalia Amaya’s recent work. She explicates 
a context of pursuit as ‘an intermediate stage that is exceedingly important, to 
wit, a “context of pursuit”, in which working hypotheses are subjected to a prelim-
inary assessment and developed in further detail’ (Amaya 2015, p. 505, footnote 
omitted). She employs it to argue that an integral part of legal decision-making is 
to make ‘a reasonable pool of alternatives … the best that they can be, in order 
to ensure a fair comparison of their relative degree of coherence’ (Amaya 2015, 
p.  508, see also p. 509-515). Although she focuses on legal decision-making 
(see e.g., main tenet on p. 531), her model does not preclude reasoning in legal 
research, in my opinion. Important elements in her model are derived from the 
philosophy of science. For example, she presents the context of pursuit with refer-
ence to Laudan (Amaya 2015, p. 505, note 78). Other important elements are also 
associated with theories encompassing research. Central features of her notion of 
coherence, such as ‘constraint-satisfaction’, are modelled after Thagard’s notion, 
which concerns several domains (Amaya 2015, see e.g., p. 195-244, p. 478 and 
p. 487-503). Contextually variant constraints are also associated with Peczenik’s 
coherence theory of law (Amaya 2015, p. 23-37, p. 531 and p. 547), which encom-
passes research (see e.g., Peczenik 2009, p. 198). Generally, Amaya’s model has 
‘building blocks’ (p. 477) from a broad interdisciplinary background, not limited 
to theories of legal decision-making.13 In this view, Amaya’s model does not pre-
clude reasoning in legal research, although she focuses on decision-making.
Still, legal research and decision-making differ, and their distinguishing prop-
erties are significant. Due attention must be given to contextually variant con-
straints (Amaya 2015, see e.g., p. 478-479, p. 487-503 and p. 525-531), such as 
institutional structures for legal decision-making, different time constraints and 
distinguishing argumentative roles for authoritative aspects such as precedents 
and a constitutional framework. Such differencing factors are central to Amaya’s 
model (see e.g., p. 487-503, p. 525-531 and p. 547). Consequently, more research 
is required to fully establish whether Amaya’s coherence theory of legal reason-
ing, including the idea of structural commonalities in coherence-based reasoning 
(see e.g., p. 471, footnote 1, see also p. 544-551) and accompanying constraints 
that vary with context (see e.g., p. 487-503, p. 525-531 and p. 547), may accom-
modate reasoning in legal research.
In summary, the idea that legal researchers pursue the potential of relevant, 
different approaches is currently part of several discursive fronts. So how do 
13 Exhibiting a context of pursuit in itself; see e.g., p. 471.
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researchers explore the potential of diverse promising lines of inquiry into law? 
In section four I argue that researchers pursue legal research by constructing 
promising lines of inquiry into a research field. Subsequently, in section five, I 
highlight that clarifying the potential of such a field of inquiry in discourse with 
fellow legal scholars is integral to researchers’ determination of what is worthy 
of pursuit.
4 Constructing Promising Lines of Inquiry
How do legal researchers form a pursuit-worthy field of inquiry? Of central con-
cern here is that assessments of pursuit worthiness differ from discerning merely 
possible, albeit fascinating lines of inquiry capable of illuminating a research 
question. In legal research it is not necessarily easy to identify where generating 
background knowledge about the field of inquiry ends and pursuing promising 
insight begins. Naturally, legal research requires some initial background knowl-
edge of the field of inquiry (see e.g., Donnelly 2007, p. 78; Giudice 2015, p. 75-76). 
Initially, developing such knowledge involves mapping the field of inquiry to 
discern, at least provisionally, the proper research topic, to explicate the main 
research question and to find possible lines of further investigation (Taekema & 
van der Burg 2014, p. 142). Arguing that ‘it is possible to identify the subject matter 
prior to working through (competing) approaches’ (Halpin 2009, p. 153 italics in 
original) highlights such an initial phase in legal research.
However, delineating a legal field of inquiry is not discovery in the sense of simply 
observing law as a distant, fully discernible object, nor is it merely identifying 
possible lines of inquiry. Systems of rules, for instance, are ‘not “out there” and 
ready to be discovered’ (d’Aspremont 2017, p. 370). Additionally, several possible 
lines of inquiry into a field of research often co-exist (see e.g., d’Aspremont 2017, 
p. 369; Taekema & van der Burg 2014, p. 130-132). So delineating a legal field 
of inquiry requires constructing promising lines of inquiry in light of methodo-
logical assessments of what constitutes improved understanding. Together, such 
promising lines of inquiry form a ‘problemfield’ that requires ‘further investiga-
tion’ (Šešelja & Straßer 2014, p. 3132).
What represents promising lines of inquiry differs, though, since fields of law 
and  research traditions differ (see e.g., Aagaard 2010; generally Whitt 1990, 
p. 479). Some fields of law might have a distinct factual context, such as biolaw, 
which is a field of legal concerns, questions and developments relating to the life 
sciences, particularly biomedical research such as stem cell research, and devel-
opments in applying such knowledge through technology, notably biotechnology. 
Biolaw’s factual context is the life sciences (Chen 2008, p. 1029), primarily bio-
medical research (Andorno 2013, p. 118; van Beers, Corrias & Werner 2014, p. 2), 
and developments regarding applying such knowledge through technology, nota-
bly biotechnology. Whether this factual context represents a promising line of 
inquiry for an individual researcher depends on many factors (see generally Whitt 
1990, p. 479). However, the character of the research question is essential (see 
e.g., Donnelly 2007, p. 83; Van Hoecke 2015, p. 1; Vranken 2011, p. 118). If, for 
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instance, the main research question concerns the biolegal concept of humanity, 
there is potential insight in inquiring what it means to be human and exploring 
specifically whether we should ‘understand “human” to refer to certain biological 
and genetic characteristics?’ (van Beers, Corrias & Werner 2014, p. 14-15, see also 
p. 2).
Although assessments of pursuit worthiness greatly depend on the research ques-
tion, some main lines of inquiry generally tend to pertain to a legal field of inquiry 
(see generally Whitt 1992). One generally promising line of inquiry concerns the 
characteristic attributes of the legal framework. The biolegal field provides an 
example. Biolaw has distinct international dimensions. Biolaw originates partly 
from international criminal law (van Beers, Corrias & Werner 2014, p. 9). Pres-
ently, a ‘return of biolaw to its Nuremberg roots in international criminal law’ 
may be unfolding (van Beers, Corrias & Werner 2014, p. 14). Another interna-
tional dimension to biolaw consists of recent international instruments ‘heavily 
influenced by human rights thinking’ (van Beers, Corrias & Werner 2014, p. 10). 
Central among these instruments is the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology 
and Medicine (the Oviedo Convention), April 4, 1997, adopted by the Council of 
Europe.14 Three declarations adopted by the United Nations Educational, Scien-
tific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) – infused with ideas of human rights – 
are also integral to international biolaw: the Universal Declaration on the Human 
Genome and Human Rights, November 11, 1997,15 the International Declara-
tion on Human Genetic Data, October 16, 200316 and the Universal Declaration 
on Bioethics and Human Rights, October 19, 2005.17 If, for instance, the main 
research question is whether there is a collective dimension to human dignity (see 
e.g., Andorno 2013, p. 51; Werner 2014, p. 343), insight can be sought in biolegal 
regulation (see Werner 2014, p. 347), such as the UNESCO Universal Declaration 
on Bioethics and Human Rights, which ‘conveys the sense of our essential con-
nectedness (and concomitantly, our mutual responsibilities) in a series of articles’ 
(Brownsword 2014, p. 4).
A second example of a generally promising line of inquiry is to discern essential 
challenges concerning central purposes and values of a legal field. For example, 
biolegal researchers face biolaw’s fundamental challenge of balancing progress 
and protection. This basic biolegal dilemma can be simplified and summarized in 
an essential question, at least in biolaw involving biomedical research: How do we 
balance the freedom of science including the use of biotechnology and concerns 
14 Available at conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/164.htm (last visited July 4, 2017). 
Additional protocols omitted.
15 Available at www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/bioethics/human-
genome-and-human-rights/ (last visited July 4, 2017).
16 Available at www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/bioethics/human- 
genetic-data/ (last visited July 4, 2017). 
17 Available at www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/bioethics/bioethics- 
and-human-rights/ (last visited July 4, 2017).
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for human dignity and humanity? (See e.g., van Beers, Corrias & Werner 2014, 
p. 2.)
Generally, researchers explore a combination of such aspects and others when 
forming a promising field of inquiry. Worth emphasizing is that exploring such 
lines of inquiry continuously requires assessments of pursuit worthiness. Con-
sider the example of balancing progress and protection as an inherent challenge 
to researching biolaw. Here, the concerns for both progress and protection must 
be specified. What kind of progress is implied or intended? Acknowledging the 
inherent complexity of the life sciences and their manifold developmental trajec-
tories is just part of this methodological challenge. Presuppositions about what 
scientific progress entails interact with ideas of what societal progress means 
(Altwicker & Diggelmann 2014). The multitude societal interests, including sig-
nificant commercial interests, involved when evaluating the prospects of biotech-
nology for preventing and treating illnesses also generate complexity. In addition 
to articulating and continuously challenging such ideas regarding what progress 
entails, the dilemma requires questioning what ‘protection’ means. Put simply, 
developments in the life sciences and related technology trigger essential pro-
tective concerns, such as concerns about protecting human dignity (Beyleveld & 
Brownsword 2001) and humanity (van Beers, Corrias &Werner 2014). Such con-
cerns involve many questions, as when developments in biotechnology accentu-
ate a societal backdrop of extensive pluralism. Deciding how to understand and 
relate to this pluralism is integral to conducting biolegal research. Additionally, 
intergenerational dimensions are of growing concern (see e.g., Andorno 2013, 
p.  51). Consequently, when aiming for improved understanding of the balanc-
ing of progress and protection in the biolegal field, legal researchers confront a 
noteworthy methodological challenge: they must constantly refine what both 
progress and protection entail when delineating a pursuit-worthy problem field 
for further research. Such questioning and specification along promising lines of 
inquiry depend on assessments of pursuit worthiness.
However, to ensure that efforts at constructing and refining lines of inquiry are 
transparent (Donnelly 2007, p. 95; Vranken 2011, p. 119) and resonate with the 
broader research field and community of legal scholars, a researcher cannot assess 
pursuit worthiness entirely in solitude. Such assessments must be clarified and 
calibrated through discourse with fellow legal researchers. This aspect of assess-
ing pursuit worthiness is highlighted in the following section.
5 Clarifying the Potential of Promising Approaches
When researchers construct promising lines of inquiry, they must take into 
account that specific lines of inquiry both provide opportunities for insight and 
entail limitations – as all methodological assessments do (Donnelly 2007, p. 95; 
Sokhi-Bulley 2013, p. 10; Vranken 2006, p. 93). To clarify which potential for 
insight a located field of inquiry contains, researchers assess pursuit worthiness 
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in discourse with fellow researchers.18 Such discourse is both constructive and 
critical. It is constructive because it allows researchers to develop intellectual dis-
tinctiveness by articulating nascent ideas of pursuit worthiness. Also, clarifying 
pursuit worthiness requires a ‘focus on certain positive features’ and ‘strengths’ 
within an approach (Šešelja & Straßer 2014, p. 3122). Allowing more than one 
favoured approach as being promising for further scrutiny is possible (Šešelja & 
Straßer 2014, p. 3121; Whitt 1990, p. 476 and p. 478; 1992, p. 632).
Secondly, such discourse is critical because it creates opportunities to revisit pre-
sumptions and expectations of fruitfulness, to adjust, supplement or discard 
them if necessary (Donnelly 2007, p. 79; Šešelja, Kosolosky & Straßer 2012, p. 14; 
Šešelja & Straßer 2014, p. 3122-3123; Whitt 1990, p. 469). Clarifying and cali-
brating pursuit worthiness always permits a change of perspective, arguably even 
serendipity (see e.g., van Gestel, Micklitz & Maduro 2012, p. 23). Evaluating the 
methodology for proceeding along certain lines of inquiry is integral. Also, debat-
ing pursuit worthiness creates an opportunity to manage ‘cognitive dissonance’ 
(Balkin 1993, p. 144) triggered by, for example, gaps, tensions or other ‘short-
comings’ (Šešelja & Straßer 2014, p. 3122 and p. 3136). Both exposure to disa-
greement and discourse aimed at seeking common ground enable such in-depth 
assessments of individual lines of inquiry and enable comparisons of the pursuit 
worthiness of various lines of inquiry (see generally Šešelja, Kosolosky & Straßer 
2012, p. 15-17).
Constructive and critical discourse about pursuit worthiness is essential to cre-
ativity and innovation in legal research. Clarifying potential through discourse 
is an active, creative process, accelerated by continuous questioning, resilience 
(Šešelja & Straßer 2014, p. 3131) and resourcefulness. Metaphorically speaking, 
debating assessments of what is pursuit worthy creates a ‘space to think’ (Riles 
2016, p. 23) by imagining (Halpin 2009, p. 149) different, yet interrelated, rel-
evant aspects of the field of inquiry, by turning around the image of a field and 
trying different lines of inquiry. Such exploration of potential insight creates 
‘breathing room’ for a problem (Riles 2016, p. 24), prior to researchers’ choice of 
the best approach to the research question at hand.
Constructive and critical discourse about pursuit worthiness can also challenge 
hegemonic presuppositions of what is pursuit worthy in legal research. Some lines 
of inquiry into a problem field may become dominant at the expense of others 
(see e.g., van Beers, Corrias & Werner 2014, p. 2-3). Overlooked potential lines 
of inquiry cause missed opportunities for insight. Especially if ‘scholars have the 
innate urge to view their own angle as universally valid’, as Vranken says (2006, 
p. 93), constructive and critical discourse about pursuit worthiness is instrumen-
tal to legal research and methodology.
18 Such discourse is, as I understand, implicit in Šešelja and Straßer’s ‘initial’ and ‘successive’ 
assessments of pursuit worthiness, see p. 3123-3135. See also p. 3115; Šešelja, Kosolosky and 
Straßer 2012, p. 6 and p. 12-14; Whitt 1992, p. 477. 
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6 Concluding Remarks
Throughout this article, I have emphasized that bringing assessments of pursuit 
worthiness to light benefits debate about legal research and methodology. I have 
highlighted that assessing pursuit worthiness involves constructing and explor-
ing promising lines of inquiry in search of fruitful contributions to improved 
understanding of law. In addition, I have emphasized that discourse with fellow 
researchers helps clarify and calibrate the potential of a located field of inquiry.
Naturally, the strengths of an approach often appears most clearly after a 
researcher has finally chosen and thoroughly substantiated what unfolds as the 
best way to approach and answer the research question (Vranken 2006, p. 93; 
2011, p. 117). Therefore, debate about pursuing legal research often gravitates 
towards the question of what the most fruitful approach is. Still, attentiveness to 
researchers’ assessments of pursuit worthiness benefits current debate about legal 
research and methodology in several ways. It contributes to precision and nuance 
in current discussions about what is fruitful, valuable or useful legal research. 
Attentiveness to how and why assessments of pursuit worthiness are essential 
in such discussions may facilitate closer interconnections between related dis-
cursive strands. Linking such discursive strands may create ‘cross-fertilization’ 
(Virgo 2013, p. 98) of ideas and concerns of pursuit worthiness, even though 
methodological challenges in one field might not be immediately transferable to 
other fields. In short, increased attention to assessments of pursuit worthiness 
nurtures both interest in and open-mindedness to the richness of legal phenom-
ena (Taekema & van der Burg 2014, p. 138. See also generally Šešelja, Kosolosky 
& Straßer 2012, p. 15-17; Whitt 1992, p. 632).
As indicated, more research is needed into how legal researchers assess pursuit 
worthiness. Particularly needed is legal research into whether it is beneficial 
to develop criteria that can help specify kinds of potential (see generally Whitt 
1990, p. 467; 1992), that can indicate sufficient potential (see generally Šešelja & 
Straßer 2014, p. 3122) or that may cause caution. Pivotal is also meta-evaluation 
of such criteria (see generally Šešelja & Straßer 2014, p. 3137). Important ques-
tions also remain regarding how assessments of pursuit worthiness fit into the 
bigger picture of the interconnected methodological assessments made through-
out the legal research process.
Still, highlighting that legal researchers assess which lines of inquiry are pur-
suit worthy increases awareness of a specific modality (see generally Whitt 
1990, p.  467) of legal research. Here, researchers conduct explorative and ten-
tative assessments of what constitutes improved understanding of law. As such, 
assessing pursuit worthiness differs both from mapping which lines of inquiry 
are capable of illuminating a research question and from ultimately determin-
ing what unfolds as the best way to approach and solve the research question at 
hand. Increased awareness of these explorative and tentative aspects of how legal 
researchers assess pursuit worthiness contributes to contemporary discourse 
about legal methodology.
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